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Abstract 
Using a database of 2,263 responses to R&D public calls in Catalonia, during the period 
2007–2010, this paper proceeds to analyse the potential interaction of the territorial and 
policy dimensions with the propensity to apply for, and be awarded, a public R&D subsidy. 
Controlling for characteristics at the firm and project level, we estimate models using a two-
step procedure. In the first step, our results suggest that large firms which export and which 
belong to high-tech manufactures are more likely to participate in a public R&D call. 
Furthermore, both urban location and past experience of such calls have a positive effect. 
Our territorial proxy of information spillovers shows a positive sign, but this is only 
significant at intra-industry level. Membership of one of the sectors prioritized by the Catalan 
government, perhaps surprisingly, does not have a significant impact. In the second step, our 
results show that cooperative projects, SMEs or old firms shows a positive effect on the 
probability of obtaining a public subsidy. Finally, the cluster policy does not show a clear 
relationship with the public R&D call, suggesting that cluster policies and R&D subsidies 
follow different goals. Our results are in line with previous results in the literature, but they 
highlight the unequal territorial distribution of the firms which apply and the fact that 
policymakers should interlink the decision criteria for their public call with other policies. 
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A territorial approach to R&D subsidies: 
Empirical evidence for Catalonian firms 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, European countries have promoted R&D among firms, in particular Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). To achieve this, governments may use a variety of tools 
such as public grants, loans, tax incentives or direct research in public laboratories or 
universities. The tool used is relevant, since some may be more precise and efficient. 
Evidence shows that public grants are the most selective (vertical tools) while R&D tax 
incentives are less able to prioritize target firms (horizontal tools).1 The evaluation of public 
policies is necessary to shed light on the best tools for promoting innovation and to offer 
information about the effectiveness of each. 
 
From a theoretical approach, the main reason for providing public funding for R&D is the 
existence of market failures, among others, those of additionality, informational 
asymmetries and knowledge spillovers. It is well-known that the knowledge market usually 
fails to provide enough incentives for R&D investment (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). Thus, 
market failures of private R&D justify government intervention. Government support for 
R&D has been widely accepted, in contrast to public support in other areas, and recently 
many works have dealt with the effects of public support of R&D (Catozzella and Vivarelli, 
2011). However, the ambivalent empirical results (Lichtenberg, 1984, 1987; Holemans and 
Sleuwaegen, 1988; Antonelli, 1989; Levy, 1990; David et al., 2000; Klette et al., 2000; 
Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2012)2 have heightened the interest in the evaluation of public 
resources devoted to promoting R&D investment. 
 
Growing competition has created a selection process between firms, industries and, latterly 
between territories. This is causing regional inequalities to emerge during the current crisis. 
To address this situation, coordination and accurate design of policies will be crucial, in 
particular when public subsidies to attract firms seem to have limited impact in territories 
without previous geographical agglomeration of firms. In consequence, there are 
implications for the geographical distribution of governmental expenditure on such 
incentives and for economic activity (Devereux et al., 2007). Obviously, unequal territorial 
distribution may imply that the distribution of R&D subsidies will also depend on 
territorial characteristics. Despite this, there is a lack of knowledge of the interaction 
between R&D policies and the territorial dimension. 
 
                                                 
1 For 17 OECD countries between 1981 and 1996, Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003) show the ambiguous 
impact of public R&D subsidies and tax incentives on private R&D investment. More recently, Santamaría et 
al. (2010) analyzed the differences between subsidies and credits for Spanish firms. Their results show that 
the Spanish public agency uses subsidies and credits as financial tools to address different objectives.  
2 Klette et al. (2000) and David et al. (2000) offer two surveys of econometric studies. Both authors discuss 
methodological aspects that may account, to some extent, for the absence of unambiguous results. David et 
al. (2000) also offer a survey of the empirical evidence accumulated over 35 years on this topic. Findings are 
ambivalent and depend on the database and the biases of the econometric tools used.  
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This paper aims to disentangle the relationship between the territorial and sectoral 
dimensions and the likelihood of participating and being successful in a public R&D call. 
Following previous literature, (Barajas and Huergo, 2009; Huergo and Trenado, 2008, 
2010; Barajas et al., 2012), our empirical approach takes into account that the award of a 
public call is the result of two decisions. Firstly, firms have to decide to respond to the 
public call and, secondly, they must receive the award. Our study can handle this double 
decision, since our database differentiates between participants and non-participants in a 
public call and between awarded and non-awarded firms. We merge two sources, one from 
the Catalan agency responsible for promoting private innovation (ACC1Ó) and another 
from the Mercantile Register, Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI). Here, in line 
with previous works (Huergo and Trenado, 2008, 2010; Santamaría et al., 2012), we apply a 
Heckman model. 
 
Our main results are the following. In regard to the determinants of participating, the 
variables large size, exporting activity or belonging to a high-tech manufacturer have a 
significant and positive impact. Furthermore, a firm’s previous participation enhances its 
current participation in the public call. In regard to the determinants of being awarded, we 
find that projects presented cooperatively have a greater likelihood of obtaining an R&D 
award. In regard to our territorial variables, we observe different patterns. Firstly, firms in 
the densest Catalan metropolitan area have a lower probability of participating, while those 
in the second metropolitan belt have a higher probability. Hence, our results suggest that 
an unequal territorial propensity applies to this R&D subsidy. Secondly, our proxy of 
public information spillovers also shows a positive sign, but one only significant at intra-
industry level. Finally, the interaction between a targeted policy, such as the R&D subsidy, 
and the cluster policy does not show any relation (with the exception of the Information 
and communications technology sector, ICT, which shows a significant but negative 
impact). Consequently, our results suggest that the Catalan cluster policy and public R&D 
subsidies pursue different goals. 
 
This article contributes to the literature on three points. Firstly, our sample contains 
information at the firm and the project level, so we can analyse jointly the characteristics of 
participants and the innovation project submitted to the call. The vast majority of empirical 
work has tackled the effects of public R&D at the firm level, while the innovation project 
dimension has been neglected. Our database differentiates between participants and non-
participants in a public R&D call (“InnoEmpresa”) and between awarded and non-awarded 
firms. Secondly, we adopt a territorial approach since the database includes information on 
the firm’s location. The territorial dimension has usually been ignored in previous analysis, 
even though the territorial characteristics of a region may condition firms to participate in 
and obtain public R&D subsidies. Finally, empirical literature ignores governmental goals 
that are achieved through different tools created by agencies. Here, we analyse whether 
firms located in particular clusters have a higher likelihood of participating or obtaining a 
subsidy. From the public policy approach, we analyse the interaction between the R&D 
subsidies and the sectoral cluster policy in Catalonia. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the literature related to the 
participation and selection of public R&D subsidies; Section 3 describes the database. 
Section 4 outlines the econometric methodology and descriptive statistics; Section 4 reports 
our results, and the final section presents the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. R&D subsidies: A literature review of public and private decisions 
 
Klette et al. (2000) and David et al. (2000) conclude with two recommendations for 
tackling the ambiguous empirical results. Firstly, empirical methods must control for 
selection and endogeneity bias, which arise from the fact that participation in a R&D 
program is not random. And secondly, structural models of the decisions of both the 
public agency and the firm should be developed in order to improve our understanding of 
R&D subsidy effects. Consequently, this section reviews the literature on the factors 
affecting the decision to participate and to obtain a public R&D subsidy (see Table 1 for a 
summary). 
 
------------Insert Table 1--------------- 
 
2.1. Private decisions to participate 
 
Previous empirical literature has tried to analyse the determinants of participation in R&D 
calls. However, due to limited information in the datasets, much of this literature is not 
able to delve into the factors that affect a firm’s decision to apply for a public subsidy; 
neither do they have information on non-awarded participants—see Blanes and Busom 
(2004) for the Spanish Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales and Busom et al. (2012) for an 
example of the Spanish CIS.3 However, it is crucial to have detailed information, not only 
at firm level but also at project level (Clausen, 2009). Consequently, other studies have used 
databases from public agencies which do contain detailed information on participants and 
projects. Some Spanish examples are Santamaría et al. (2010), with the PROFIT initiative, 
and Huergo and Trenado (2008, 2010), with a CDTI program. 
 
The empirical estimation of the determinants of participation in a public R&D call requires 
controlling for endogeneity. This is because the determinants for a firm which actually 
receives a public subsidy will be rather similar to those determinants that lead the firm to 
apply in the first place. This problem constitutes a limitation for studies, such as Santamaría 
et al. (2010) who analyse cooperative R&D project calls during the period 2000–2003 but 
who have only participant information. To address this problem, recent empirical studies 
(Huergo and Trenado, 2008, 2010; Takalo et al., 2008; Barajas et al., 2012) propose a two-
step analysis methodology. Initially, the determinants that lead a firm to apply for a public 
subsidy are estimated and, subsequently, the model identifies the determinants that result in 
                                                 
3 For instance, the CIS questionnaire asks firms the following question: “Has your enterprise received any kind of 
public support for innovation-related activities in the last three years?”. 
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a firm obtaining a subsidy. This methodology controls for the correlation of the error terms 
due to unobserved characteristics. 
 
From a sample of Spanish firms which obtained low-interest credit during the period 
2002–2005, Huergo and Trenado (2008, 2010) identified that young firms, exporters, 
companies that belong to a high or medium-tech industry and firms with previous 
experience in similar programs have a higher probability of applying for credit. Also, 
Barajas et al. (2012) find that, in addition to financial variables, being an exporter, a smaller 
firm or a Knowledge Intensive Service (KIS), have positive impacts on the probability of 
participation in an EU Framework Programme (FP) cooperation project. 
 
Despite the limited information, for a sample of Spanish firms Blanes and Busom (2004) 
find that human capital, firm size and being a domestic firm may be factors which 
positively affect the likelihood of participating in and obtaining a public call.4 Czarnitzki 
and Licht (2006) for panel data of German firms also found that exporters and firms based 
abroad show a greater propensity to participate in R&D subsidies, while firms that do not 
take out patents are less prone to receive awards.5 Furthermore, these authors show that 
there are regional differences between the input additionality of East and West Germany. 
Although they know whether a firm participates or not, they do not have information at 
project level. 
 
In fact, the literature on regional economics shown that firm location depends both on 
time and space. The importance of space in the productive activity was highlighted by 
Alfred Marshall (1890). Later, a wide variety of theoretical and empirical contributions on 
the effects of geographical concentration appeared (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Audretsch and 
Feldman, 1996; Porter, 2003). 
 
Space plays a key role in the generation of spillovers related to knowledge and information. 
In other words, production exhibits a spatial concentration, but activities related to 
knowledge and information depend even more on space (Feldman, 1994). Geographical 
concentration of firms permits them to enjoy knowledge spillovers which allow access 
external technological resources, facilitate cooperation and improve their absorptive 
capacity. The information relating to one specific event, for instance a public R&D call, can 
be easily codified and has a singular meaning and interpretation. However, knowledge, or 
what is sometimes referred to as tacit knowledge, is vague and difficult to codify (Jacobs, 
1969). In this context, a firm’s projects usually require not only tacit knowledge, but also 
information, to have access to public calls. In spite of the potential effect of space, hardly 
anything is known about the effects of policies aiming to promote R&D activity at the 
                                                 
4 Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) only has information on firms that apply and are 
awarded. Hence, they do not have information of the non-awarded participants.  
5 Similarly, the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) has information on whether or not the firms have received 
innovation support from public sources but does not provide information on non-awarded participants. 
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territorial level (Engel et al., 2013).6 And, in particular, a few works have shown evidence of 
a territorial dimension to the participation in a public R&D call. 
 
Hence, we are interested here in analysing the territorial dimension of the probability that a 
firm applies for an R&D call, and also is awarded it by the Catalan government. Firms 
apply to public calls based on their past R&D activity, but also based on the support to 
apply to them and their capacity to find a partner to carry out the R&D project. Our goal is 
complementary to the recent theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of the 
geographical concentration of firms and innovative activities. 
 
In recent years, some studies have questioned the literature which highlights the linearity of 
economic agglomerations. Authors such as Zucker et al. (2006) and Klepper (2007), point 
out that there are significant learning effects arising from geographical proximity to 
previous adopters. Given that learning effects are higher in local agglomerations, local 
firms enjoy higher knowledge competences and absorptive capacities. This results in a 
“selection of the fittest” process emerging in the production and innovation of more dense 
territories. Finally, some authors such as Boschma and Frenken (2010) question any direct 
and simple relation between innovation and concentration. They introduced the so-called 
proximity paradox which explains that, while proximity may be a crucial driver for agents 
to connect and exchange knowledge, nevertheless too much proximity between such 
agents might harm their innovative performance. In other words, while a high degree of 
proximity may be considered a prerequisite for agent connection, proximity between agents 
does not necessarily increase their innovative performance. They argue that the relationship 
between innovation and geographical concentration follows an inverted U-shape curve. 
 
Based on the above, it is possible that firms in regions with greater density may have larger 
knowledge flows or even more competition which implies that they may apply for more 
subsidies. 
Hypothesis 1. Firms in denser territories will be more likely to participate in a 
public call. 
 
However, public policies have an impact at territorial level, not only via awarded firms, but 
also indirectly to non-awarded firms. On the one hand, subsidies that other firms receive 
may have a positive effect on the propensity of a firm to apply for subsidies. This situation 
may be the result of flows of R&D personnel and R&D cooperation agreements. On the 
other hand, it may be the case that subsidies given to specific firms may discourage access 
to these for other firms due to the fact that a subsidized project absorbs a large amount of 
scientific resources.7 Consequently, competitors will observe a reduction of profitability in 
their R&D projects (David et al., 2000). Here, we consider that the impact may be different 
                                                 
6 As Glaeser et al. (1992, p. 1126) noted “intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more 
easily than oceans and continents”. Hence, knowledge has a complex dimension that must interact with 
workers, assets and some external services of advisors and management. 
7 The inelastic supply of R&D inputs may result in an increase of R&D inputs which displaces inputs from 
non-subsidized firms to subsidized firms that have more capacity to pay higher prices (David and Hall, 2000). 
In particular, this effect has been pointed out for researchers’ wages (Goolsbee, 1998; Reinthaler and Wolff, 
2004; Ali-Yrkkö, 2005; Aerts, 2008). 
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depending on whether the firm which receives the subsidy belongs to the same or to a 
different sector. Consequently, there may be two different hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2. The awarded projects of firms in a particular sector act as an 
incentive for the participation of other territorially close firms in the same 
sector. 
Hypothesis 3. The awarded projects of firms in a particular sector act as an 
incentive for the participation of other territorially close firms in different 
sectors. 
 
 
2.2. R&D subsidies and agency selection 
 
In spite of the fact that governments design their public policies to promote private R&D 
through their public agencies, few studies examine the criteria used by governmental 
evaluators to select projects (Hsu et al., 2003; Lee and Om, 1996, 1997; Takalo et al., 2008). 
However, for a number of reasons, it is crucial to delve deeper into this issue. Firstly, the 
selection process reflects the real objectives of policymakers. Secondly, they determine the 
characteristics of those projects that are developed and, consequently, the results obtained. 
Thirdly, public calls have impacts at sectoral and territorial level. Methodologically, the 
most recent articles with information at project level (Takalo et al., 2008; Huergo and 
Trenado, 2008, 2010; Barajas et al., 2012) apply a two-step methodology where the 
probability of receiving a public R&D call depends on the previous participation. 
 
The design of public R&D subsidies entails multiple decisions relating to the assignation of 
public resources with respect to other tools available, the time of applicability, the criteria 
of the call, the profile of firms that will be prioritized and the sectoral and territorial 
dimensions, among other questions. In our case, the Catalan public agency makes three 
decisions during the selection process. Firstly, if the project accomplishes all the 
requirements of a call it will be accepted for later evaluation; secondly, an ad-hoc technical 
commission will be formed to decide to accept or reject a project according to established 
selection criteria; and finally, this technical commission will allocate an amount of funding 
to an accepted project. The first decision is automatic —if negative, it excludes a project 
from further consideration. The second and third decisions entail some discrimination 
among the accepted projects in terms of the type and amount of finance provided 
(Santamaría et al., 2010). Consequently, governments may include other criteria which are 
not strictly related to the characteristics of the firm or project in question. 
 
Different sets of variables may influence the decision to select a firm for receipt of a 
subsidy. A first set includes characteristics of the firm such as age, size, sector and 
dynamicity. A second set includes project characteristics such as the project size or the 
internal quality evaluation of the project. Finally, regional variables may also affect the 
decision. Santamaría et al. (2010, p. 552) recognize the difficulties of modelling these 
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political criteria and they introduce different empirical dummies to capture the differences 
between the Spanish regions.8 
 
The capacity to discriminate is pointed out in Blanes and Busom (2004). According to 
these authors, public agencies may use financial support for R&D to achieve two important 
goals: i) fostering national champions; and ii) encouraging the technological upgrading of 
firms in declining or traditional industries. In the first case, the idea would be to fund those 
R&D projects that are most likely to achieve technological and/or commercial success. In 
the second case, the objective is to increase the chances of a firm’s survival. Such reasoning 
implies that an agency’s goals, or combinations of goals, will vary across industries. 
 
Thus, governments may take into account the existence of clusters as a starting point to 
formulate policies and strategies.9 Our hypothesis is that the Catalan government may take 
sectoral cluster specialization into account; we may consider that it does not focus on one 
goal, but on a diversity of goals: to promote R&D, but also to concentrate on specific 
sectoral clusters. This disagrees with Afcha (2012) who states that public agencies tend to 
prioritize high-tech firms. That hypothesis is also emphasized by Klette et al. (2000) who 
notes that “a significant portion of the support to commercial R&D is targeted towards 
new and high-tech businesses and emerging technologies, and it seems to be based on 
infant industry arguments.” By considering the cluster policy, we may assess not only the 
published objectives of the public call, but also those “revealed” objectives which were not 
official. 
Hypothesis 4. The Catalan government prioritizes firms that belong to a particular 
sectoral cluster. 
 
Furthermore, Afcha (2012) points out that public agencies also tend to prioritize those 
firms with better opportunities for success. Thus, they may apply a “picking-the-winner” 
strategy that gives subsidies to projects that are already viable. In that case, non-subsidized 
firms will leave the market.10 Lerner (2002, p.81–82) underlines that “past grants, regardless 
of project outcomes, help a company gain legitimacy in a particular area of research, as well 
as acquire the equipment and personnel needed to do future work. There is also a tendency 
for some government programs to try to ‘piggyback’ on other government programs, 
hoping to leverage their grant dollars. In addition, firms gain considerable insight on the 
grant application process with each proposal they submit. These firms consequentially 
often have a greater chance of being awarded future government grants than other firms.” 
Generally, the “Picking-the-winner” strategy appears because: i) technocrats in charge of 
policies do not want to give the impression of “wasting public money”; ii) policymakers 
                                                 
8 According to Santamaría et al. (2010, p. 552): “it is possible that regional differences in the selection of 
projects are related to the peculiarities of regional industrial systems (i.e. firm characteristics), which may 
influence the level of support given to firms from different regions. It is possible also that politics plays a part 
in regional differences”. 
9 Public agencies may have more incentives to choose those projects belonging to more innovative firms, 
which have a higher likelihood to succeed and offer a higher return from taxes (Kauko, 1996; Lichtenberg, 
1984; Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). In this case, public subsidies are given to projects that would be funded 
with private resources (for a recent survey see Cantner and Kösters (2012)). 
10 However, if policy-makers are able not only to distinguish viable projects but also those that need 
additional public resources, then the distortion will be minimized (Shane, 2009). 
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may prefer to focus on technological sectors with more future potential. However, public 
subsidies may be more effective in the case of funding R&D projects that would not be 
continued without this public funding (Lach, 2002). 
Hypothesis 5. The Catalan government prioritizes firms that have previously 
obtained an R&D subsidy. 
 
 
3. Database description 
 
Our sample is a merge of an ACC1Ó database and the SABI database. The latter comprises 
Catalan firms registered in the Mercantile Register and offers information related to balance 
sheets at a firm level from 2004 until 2011. One particularity of our database is that we 
know firm location; as opposed to previous scholars, we are in a position to adopt a 
territorial approach.11 
 
ACC1Ó is the Catalan public agency which promotes innovation and internationalization 
of firms, in particular SMEs. It aims to facilitate the competitiveness of Catalan firms. Since 
2004, the main policy tool of the Catalan government has been public R&D subsidies. 
Although governmental aims are diverse, they mainly focus on reducing the cost of R&D 
and innovation projects of Catalan firms. 
 
The database from ACC1Ó is associated with four public calls between 2007 and 2010 
from the initiative “InnoEmpresa”. The public call consisted of non-refundable R&D 
subsidies targeted at innovation projects presented by Catalan firms. The project needed to 
develop a new product, a new process, a new methodology of commercialization or a new 
organizational methodology in order to increase the firm’s competitive advantages. 
Participants could either present their project individually or jointly with other firms via 
intermediate organisms, such as technological centres. At sectoral level, the public call did 
not have any target sector—participants were basically SMEs in manufacturing sectors, real 
estate, tourism, retail and services. 
 
The database from ACC1Ó contains 2,263 innovation projects pertaining to the public 
calls between 2007 and 2010. 1,093 innovation projects received a total subsidy amount of 
45,204,656 euros. With respect to the available information, there is general data about the 
firm (location, size, etc.) and some characteristics of the innovation projects. Furthermore, 
the information follows-up on the firm. That means we are able to know if the subsidy was 
finally accepted by the firm and if the project has been finished.12 Hence, we can study 
separately which factors determine a firm’s decision to apply and which ones affect the 
agency’s selection. 
 
                                                 
11 In fact, our territorial dimension will be at county level. Catalonia has 41 counties. Counties are 
administrative territorial areas intermediate between provinces and municipalities.  
12 However, the end date of the project is not available for many of the subsidized projects since many of 
them are unfinished or because the firm has not yet presented the final report. As a consequence, this 
information has not been considered in the analysis.  
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The selection of the final database was based on the following. Firstly, we excluded firms 
without a municipality postal code. Secondly, we selected firms that were observed over a 
period of 5 or 6 years. Thirdly, we selected firms that had declared themselves as being 
“active” in the market in 2010. Finally, we also selected firms belonging to the OECD’s 
sectoral classification as high-tech manufacturers, low-tech manufacturers and knowledge-
intensive services.13 Our sample consists of 21,531 firms that did not participate in any call 
and 608 participants in at least one of the four calls. The period of observation is between 
2006 and 2010, since some explanatory variables are lagged by one period. 
  
As a result, our database contains information at firm level for three different groups of 
firms. A first group includes those firms that did not apply for a subsidy. A second group 
includes those firms that applied for a R&D subsidy but were evaluated negatively. And 
finally, a third group includes those firms that obtained the R&D subsidy. 
 
Table 2 reveals that participants represent around 1.2% of all non-participants in this public 
call. With respect to the number of participants, we observe that the number diminishes 
slightly, with an increase during the last call. Furthermore, the mean value of the expected 
cost remains quite stable over the different calls. With respect to the amount of subsidy 
obtained and the final value that firms spent, there is an increase in the mean value between 
2007 and 2008, while simultaneously the number of firms increases. During the last year of 
observation, the average value decreases slightly. 
 
--- Insert Table 2 ------ 
 
We consider Catalonia an interesting region to evaluate the interaction between R&D 
public subsidies and the territorial dimension. Firstly, this territory is one the most dynamic 
in economic and cultural terms in Spain. Secondly, Catalonia has a long tradition in R&D 
and innovation and it has competences in the design of policies in the fields of universities, 
research and innovation. Thus, firms are subject to policies at Catalan, Spanish and 
European level which necessitate a certain complementarity, but also coordination. 
 
Finally, we must comment on some shortcomings in our data. Firstly, although we have 
information about the R&D investment for a project, we lack information relating to a 
firm’s total R&D investment and, thus, we are unable to determine a firm’s capacity to 
carry on R&D activities. However, firm size and sectoral dummies may be good proxies. 
Secondly, there is no information as to whether a firm applies for other R&D programs 
(subsidies, taxes…). Consequently, there is a lack of information about their experience of 
applying for other programs, even if they have other R&D funds. Thirdly, there is no direct 
quality ranking given by the evaluators. Finally, we assume that firms are aware of the 
existence of public support. As a consequence, we must be cautious with our results but all 
these problems are also common in previous literature. 
 
                                                 
13 Here, we classify firms into one sector in accordance with their main activity. Thus, we do not consider the 
possibility that a firm may be operating in similar or completely different sectors simultaneously. 
 
11
 
4. Econometric methodology and descriptive statistics  
 
4.1. Econometric methodology 
 
In line with previous scholars (Huergo and Trenado, 2008, 2010), we are able to distinguish 
between a firm’s decision to apply for the subsidy and the probability of receiving an award 
for an R&D project. Consequently, our model is the following: 
 
 
   xnapplicatioxnapplicatioaward
awardnapplicatioawardanreceive
,1Pr,11Pr
1,1Pr1Pr



 
 
Our first equation considers the probability that a firm decides to apply for a public R&D 
subsidy. We will consider the following equation: 
 


 

otherwise
uxfyif
y iiii
0
01 1111
1

 (1) 
where iy1  is a dummy variable which indicates that a firm decides to apply for a public 
R&D subsidy. Furthermore, iy1  is a latent dependent variable, ix1  are the determinants of 
the firm’s decision to apply, 1  corresponds to the vector of coefficients to be estimated 
and iu1  is the error term which follows  21,0 N . Firm “i” applies for the subsidy if iy1 is 
positive. 
 
Equation (1) will depend on the following set of explanatory variables ( ix1 ): 
1. Firm size: Empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between firm size and the 
likelihood of engaging in R&D activities. Hence, we expect a positive relationship 
between firm size and the probability of participating. This variable is measured by the 
value of ln(sales) and it is lagged by one period. 
2. Firm age: On the one hand, R&D and innovation are dynamic processes where 
temporal persistence is relevant, so older firms have more capacity to engage in R&D 
activities. On the other hand, young firms suffer more financial constraints, so they may 
need to have access to R&D subsidies. This leads to an unexpected result. This variable 
is measured as ln(age) and it is lagged by one period. 
3. Cash-flow ratio: R&D projects are subject to higher risks and financial barriers. 
Empirical literature shows the existence of a negative correlation between financial 
barriers and R&D performance and a positive correlation between cash-flow and the 
probability of doing R&D. We expect a positive correlation between cash-flow and the 
probability of applying for a subsidy. This variable is measured as the ratio of cash-flow 
to total assets and is lagged by one period. 
4. Long-term debt ratio: Firms with long-term debt contracts may diminish financial 
constraints. Thus, long-term debt ratio may show a positive impact on the probability of 
applying for an R&D subsidy. However, these firms are more likely to engage in R&D 
and they may be more prone to apply for public R&D subsidies. The impact is 
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unexpected. This variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and is lagged by 
one period. 
5. Export: Export activity is a proxy for a firm’s internationalization strategy. Exporting 
enlarges market opportunities and intensifies interactions with foreign partners that may 
allow for (technological) learning effects in R&D (Keller, 2010). Exporters may have 
more need to invest in R&D and, hence, to apply for public R&D subsidies. 
6. Priority: A dummy variable that indicates if a firm belongs to a sector that the Catalan 
agency considers as a priority. These sectors are automotive and motorcycle (cnae93: 
2911), biotechnology (cnae93: 3310), consumer electronics (cnae93: 30 & 31), renewable 
energy (cnae93: 4011), pharmaceutical industry (cnae93: 24), chemical industry (cnae93: 
24), advanced alimentary products (cnae93: 73) and ICT (cnae93: 6420 – 
telecommunications & cnae93: 72 computer activities). 
7. Low-tech manufactures and KIS: Sectoral particularities may cause significant 
differences. In that sense, according to Blanes and Busom (2004), firms in the same 
industry may face different hurdles in participating in the programs of different 
agencies and patterns differ across high-tech and low-tech industries. Furthermore, 
Capron and Van Pottelsberghe (1997) show that the public R&D subsidy may have a 
different impact on the private R&D investment depending on the sector. Two dummy 
variables indicate whether the firm belongs to a low-tech manufacturing industry or to 
a knowledge-intensive service. 
8. Previous application: Applying for a public subsidy requires experience of dealing with 
all the consequent administrative burdens. We expect that those firms with experience 
of applying for a public call will be more prone to participate. This variable corresponds 
to the number of previous times that a firm had applied for this public subsidy. 
9. Metrop Area 1: This dummy variable identifies firm located in the densest metropolitan 
area of Catalonia. The counties are Barcelonès, Vallès Occidental, Vallès Oriental and Baix 
Llobregat (with a population equivalent to 63.4% of Catalonia’s inhabitants and to 58% 
of the firms located in Catalonia). We may expect that large metropolitan areas create 
positive externalities due to the diversity and flow of knowledge. 
10. Metrop Area 2: This dummy variable identifies firms located in a belt surrounding the 
densest metropolitan region. The counties included are Bages, Osona, Maresme and Anoia 
(with a population equivalent to 11.8% of Catalonia’s inhabitants and 10.5% of all firms 
located in Catalonia. This area has a strong industrial tradition). 
11. InterSpillovers: Inter-industry spillovers are defined as the stock of knowledge 
available to firms located in a region that originates in sectors different to the ones in 
which the firms operate. This stock varies according to firms and regions. Inter-industry 
spillovers are an approximation to R&D linkages between firms that operate in different 
industries and do not trade with each other, but “borrow” each other's knowledge 
(Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). We estimate these externalities as: 
 
InterSpilli,t= ln(SUBSIDIEScountyi,t - SUBSIDIEScounty_sectori,t) 
 
where InterSpilloversi is the total amount of subsidies received by other firms in different 
sector and same county of a particular firm “i”. A positive sign implies a positive 
influence mediated by the firm possibly capturing positive externalities from nearby 
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firms that invest in R&D. A negative sign may imply difficulties in applying knowledge 
generated by other sectors. 
12. IntraSpillovers: Intra-industry spillovers refer to the stock of accessible know-how 
from firms in the same sector. The estimation is the following: 
 
IntraSpilloversi,t= ln(SUBSIDIEScounty_sectori,t-SUBSIDYfirmi,t) 
 
where intraSpillovers is the total amount of subsidies received by other firms in the same 
sector and county of a particular firm “i”. A positive sign exists when knowledge 
spreads to other firms in the same sector and a negative sign exists if firms protect the 
knowledge they generate and/or compete for the same R&D resources. 
 
The second equation is the probability that a firm is awarded a subsidy through agency 
selection. The dependent variable y2i is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 when 
the project is awarded. This second equation will have the following form: 
 


 

otherwise
uxfyif
y iiii
0
01 2222
2

 (2) 
where iy2  is the latent dependent variable, ix2  are the determinants of the agency’s 
selection, 2  corresponds to the vector of coefficients to be estimated and iu2  is the error 
term which follows  22,0 N . The proposal is approved if iy2  is positive. Equation (2) will 
depend on the following set of explanatory variables ( ix2 ):  
1. Project size: Empirical evidence (Heijs, 2005, Acosta and Modrego, 2001; Santamaría 
et al., 2010) shows the total budget of the R&D project to be significant in the selection 
process. This variable is measured logarithmic terms. 
2. Cooperation: Presenting a project jointly with other projects may be a characteristic 
that evaluators consider as relevant. This dummy variable identifies cooperative project. 
3. Previous concession: Evaluators may apply a “picking-the-winner”. The variable 
measures the number of times that a firm has obtained an R&D subsidy in the same 
call. 
4. Quality project: The best projects considered have a greater chance of obtaining a 
subsidy. This variable corresponds to the amount of subsidy that the firm has obtained 
as a percentage of the total amount of money requested. 
5. Quality firm: This index measures the capacity of the firm to plan and carry out the 
research project during the period of time. This variable corresponds to the amount 
that the firm finally uses as a percentage of the total amount of subsidy. 
6. Small firm and Medium-sized firm: Larger firms are in a better position to ask for 
R&D subsidies and to define better R&D projects. However, public agencies may 
prioritize SMEs and so the impact is unpredictable. This variable is a dummy variable 
with a value equal to 1 in the case that a firm is smaller than 50 employees and equal to 
1 in the case that a firm is between 50 and 250 employees. 
7. Firm age: Young firms may be more innovatively dynamic or they may suffer more 
financial constraints. As a consequence, they may need to have access to these public 
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R&D subsidies. However, public agencies may also prioritize old firms which need a 
transformation. This variable is equal to ln(age) and it is lagged by one period. 
8. Firm growth: Firm growth may be an indicator for evaluators that a firm is in a 
dynamic sector. We expect a positive impact on the probability of obtaining an R&D 
subsidy. This variable is measured by the annual growth of sales (%). 
1. Low-tech manufactures and KIS: Evaluators may prioritize firms in some sectors. We 
include two dummy variables indicating whether they belong to a low-tech 
manufacturing industry or to a knowledge-intensive sector. 
2. Cluster_agro, cluster_metal, cluster_ict: Projects of firms located in a strategic 
cluster may be preferable to evaluators when they want to promote these clusters. Three 
dummies indicate whether a firm belongs to the Catalan agroindustrial cluster 
(cluster_agro), metal cluster (cluster_metal) or ICT cluster (cluster_ict). 
 
Both equations include time dummies since, during an expansion, there are better facilities 
to gain access to financial resources, while during a financial crisis resources decrease. The 
error terms in Equations (1) and (2) might contain some commonly omitted variables, and 
therefore the correlation term ρ between u1 and u2 might be non-zero. There are different 
channels through which this bias may appear. Firstly, some firms apply for support because 
they have discovered particularly promising R&D projects. Secondly, screening of projects 
in the government agencies will also tend to create selection bias, since those firms that 
obtained a subsidy may attract more external funds due to the certifying role of public 
subsidies. Thus, in consequence, those firms may perform better and may be in a better 
position for future calls. Empirically, there may be a sample selection bias, and the 
estimation of coefficients β2, only for proposals, yields inconsistent estimates. Following 
Huergo and Trenado (2008, 2010), we estimate both equations as a probit model with 
sample selection by maximum likelihood. 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for firms’ characteristics. We classify firms according to 
our three groups of interest: firms that do not participate, firms that participate but are not 
awarded with a subsidy, and those non-awarded participants. Our results show that non-
participants are smaller and younger. However, on average their average growth rate is 
much higher which may be closely related to both previous characteristics. Also, the 
percentage of firms that export is significantly smaller than the percentage of firms that 
participate in this program. Regarding the financial ratios, non-participants obtain a smaller 
cash-flow ratio and long-term debt ratio. With respect to location, the largest percentage of 
non-participants is located in the metropolitan area of Barcelona, while a smaller 
percentage of firms is located in the second metropolitan area. However, a smaller 
percentage of firms do not belong to industries that are considered a priority by the Catalan 
government. Furthermore, non-participants have less previous experience on average than 
those that do decide to participate. Finally, with respect to spillovers, mean values are 
rather similar to firms awarded an R&D subsidy, but significantly smaller in comparison to 
non-awarded firms. 
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--- Insert Table 3 ------ 
 
Awarded firms are larger and older, but they grow less than non-awarded participants. 
Furthermore, a larger percentage of awarded firms export. The financial ratios show that 
awarded firms have a larger cash-flow ratio but a smaller long-term debt ratio. Regarding 
location, a lower percentage of awarded firms are located in the first metropolitan area, 
while a higher percentage are located in the second metropolitan area. Furthermore, 
awarded firms obtain slightly larger mean values as compared to the levels of previous 
public grants. We need to highlight that intra-industry spillovers enjoyed by awarded firms 
are smaller than those of non-awarded firms. This is a reasonable result, since awarded 
firms will not be affected by their own subsidies. However, awarded firms may benefit 
from larger inter-industry spillovers. 
 
Table 4 presents those variables related to the project characteristics and determinants of 
the probability of achieving a public R&D subsidy. Firms are classified as either awarded or 
non-awarded firms. Firstly, the project budget is slightly larger for awarded firms. Secondly, 
the percentage of projects which are cooperative is smaller for the awarded projects. 
Thirdly, the number of times that a firm had previously received the same R&D subsidy is 
quite similar between both groups. With respect to the quality of the project and the firm, 
as is to be expected, the values are larger for awarded firms (non-awarded firms may obtain 
a positive value should they refuse to accept the subsidy, despite it being awarded). Results 
show that R&D subsidies cover around 35% of the project budget and nearly all of the 
subsidy ends up being continued (90.16%). Furthermore, it seems that a smaller percentage 
of awarded firms are SMEs. Finally, a smaller percentage of awarded firms belong to the 
agricultural cluster, while a larger percentage belong to the metallic and ICTs cluster. 
 
--- Insert Table 4 ------ 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Table 5 contains the results for the estimation of the probit model with sample selection. 
The strategy for the estimations is the following: estimation (1) includes firm characteristics 
and some characteristics of the project (project size and cooperative project), estimation (2) 
includes the project characteristics and some variables related to the firm’s past behaviour, 
estimation (3) includes variables related to the territorial location in one metropolitan area, 
estimation (4) includes the cluster variables if the firm does or does not belong to one of 
the prioritized sectors of Catalan industrial policy, and estimation (5) includes spillover 
variables, both intra-industry and inter-industry effects. To begin with, we comment on the 
likelihood that a firm applies for a R&D subsidy. 
 
Firstly, firm size shows a significant positive impact, while firm age shows a negative but 
non-significant impact (except for the first estimation). Consequently, larger firms will be 
more likely to apply for a public R&D subsidy. Our evidence may confirm the fact that 
large firms are more likely to have the required financial and non-financial resources to 
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carry out R&D activities that involve sunk costs and high uncertainty. Our results are in 
line with Blanes and Busom (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006), González et al. (2005), 
Takalo et al. (2008) and Bannò and Sgobbi (2010). However, we must have in mind that 
Barajas et al. (2012) have found a negative impact of firm size on the participation of 
cooperative FP projects. Hence, this result may depend also in the type of public tool. 
 
Secondly, with respect to the financial ratios, we do not find any significant impact 
although the cash-flow ratio has a significant positive impact in estimation (1) and (2), 
while the long-term debt ratio shows a non-significant negative impact. This result is in line 
with Blanes and Busom (2004) who also find a non-significant impact while Barajas et al. 
(2012) find a significant and negative impact on the probability of participating. 
 
Thirdly, firms that compete in international markets show a greater probability of applying 
for R&D subsidies in Catalonia. This result may indicate that participation in international 
markets generates knowledge flows through improvements in a firm’s knowledge due to its 
exposure to a wider range of technologies, better international practice, and more intense 
competition in international markets. Similar results are obtained in Czarnitzki and Licht 
(2006), González et al. (2005), Barajas and Huergo (2010), Bannò and Sgobbi (2010), 
Huergo and Trenado (2010) and Barajas et al. (2012). 
 
Therefore, belonging to one of the sectors prioritized by the Catalan government does not 
seem to exert a significant impact on the probability of participating. However, it seems 
that firms in high-tech manufacturing apply more often for R&D subsidies than low-tech 
manufacturers and knowledge-intensive services. This result may be explained by the type 
of firms participating in this public call, since other works such as Barajas et al. (2012) find 
that firms in KIS sectors have a higher probability of participation. 
 
With respect to past experience, whether a firm that has applied previously increases 
significantly its propensity to participate in subsequent calls. Our results are in line with 
previous evidence such as Huergo and Trenado (2010) and Barajas et al. (2012), while 
Takalo et al. (2008) find non-linear effects for Finland. This result may explain a certain 
persistence of the R&D activity and application. But it also may be the consequence of 
firms applying for public subsidies learning from their previous experience. Along these 
lines, Blanes and Busom (2004, p. 1460) state that their results show that R&D programs 
had a limited success in reaching firms that were not already doing R&D. 
 
Regarding the location, operating in the first metropolitan area significantly decreases the 
probability of applying for a subsidy. Although the first metropolitan area agglomerates 
Catalonia’s largest percentage of firms and population, the typology of firms is also rather 
diverse, while the second metropolitan area has traditionally been more industrialized. 
Therefore, we would not accept the hypothesis that firms in the densest metropolitan area 
have a larger propensity to apply for this public R&D subsidy. This may confirm the 
unequal distribution of firms which apply. 
 
--- Insert Table 5 ------ 
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Finally, we observe that both types of spillovers show a positive impact, but these are only 
significant for intra-industrial spillovers. Thus, our results seem to shed light on the 
existence of some kind of externalities of R&D resources and knowledge flows. This would 
appear to confirm the hypothesis that the granting of R&D subsidies to a firm will 
positively affect competitors’ efforts and other firms in the same sector. Consequently, our 
second hypothesis would be accepted, while the third hypothesis would not be accepted. 
 
With respect to the likelihood of receiving an R&D subsidy, we obtain the following 
results.  
 
Firstly, project size does not seem to be a significant variable, although in general it shows a 
positive sign. Previous empirical evidence shows ambiguous results, since authors such as 
Barajas et al. (2012) show a non-significant impact of the project budget, while authors 
such as Santamaría et al. (2010) find a positive impact. Hence, the size of the project must 
have a certain impact on the final selection since some calls may limit the amount of money 
of the project.  
 
Secondly, and more interestingly, those projects that are jointly presented by a group of 
firms through an intermediate agent, demonstrate, with the exception of estimation (1), a 
higher probability of obtaining an R&D subsidy. This result provides evidence that joint 
projects are preferred by evaluators for several reasons. Firstly, collective projects may 
include a larger number of private agents under the same umbrella. Secondly, a positive 
attitude towards cooperation increases the likelihood of cooperating with new partners and 
further spreading the externalities. This result is in line with Santamaría et al. (2010), where 
the probability of obtaining a subsidy increases with the participation of a university or a 
technology institute. 
 
Thirdly, when a firm obtains an R&D subsidy and decides to participate in a future call, it 
will be less likely to obtain an R&D subsidy. Being a successful firm in the past does not 
guarantee that evaluators are going to choose these past winners in the future. This result 
may be a signal of a direct rejection of the “picking-the-winner” strategy since evaluators 
are not prioritizing past successful firms. This result is in line with Barajas et al. (2012). 
Furthermore, Takalo et al. (2008) analyse the relationship between previous applications 
and the probability of being awarded and do not find a significant impact. 
 
Fourthly, in regard to the variables related to the quality of the project and the firm, our 
results show a positive impact on the probability of obtaining an R&D subsidy. Hence, the 
better the evaluation of a firm’s quality, the better the chances of obtaining a public 
subsidy. 
 
Fifthly, in line with Takalo et al. (2008), our results show that, while large firms seem to 
participate more, small and medium firms have a higher probability of obtaining a public 
subsidy. This result is closely related to the Catalan government’s aims, since it is trying to 
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promote R&D and innovation among SMEs. However, a firm’s age shows a significant and 
positive sign once we control for the project characteristics and the persistence in 
participating and achieving public R&D subsidies. Consequently, old firms have a higher 
likelihood of obtaining an R&D subsidy, once we control quality, past experience, and 
locational variables. 
 
Sixthly, being a more dynamic firm has a non-significant impact, while firms in KIS 
services have a significantly lower probability of obtaining an R&D subsidy. Based on our 
data, we might say that the Catalan public agency seems to prioritize firms involved in 
high-tech manufacturing in order to encourage the technological upgrading of firms with 
higher opportunities for growth. This result is partially in line with Huergo and Trenado 
(2010) who find that high-tech and medium-high-tech manufacturers have a lower 
probability of securing low-interest credit. However, their result may be specific to the type 
of policy tool. 
 
With respect to cluster policy, belonging to the agroindustry or metal clusters does not 
have a significant impact, while those belonging to ICT are negatively affected in terms of 
their probability of being awarded a subsidy. This result may highlight the misalignment 
between calls for R&D subsidies and a clusters’ policy. Hence, we would not accept the 
hypothesis that firms located in sectoral clusters have a larger advantage in receiving 
subsidies; the non-relationship between the cluster policy and the R&D subsidy seem to 
confirm that different policies have different goals. 
 
Finally, similarly to Huergo and Trenado (2010), when omitting project level variables, we 
may omit relevant variables that are good proxies of unobserved factors. In consequence, 
the correlation term ρ between u1 and u2 might be unequal to zero. This would be the case 
in estimation (1). We should also remark that Takalo et al. (2008) show a significant 
coefficient, but the data related with the project is only based on the risk and the technical 
challenge. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper explores the determinants of Catalan firms for participation in public calls for 
R&D subsidies and the factors that explain the likelihood of obtaining them. Our strategy 
thus has two different stages. Following previous empirical literature, we apply a probit 
model that controls for sample selection. 
 
For the first stage, the results suggest that larger firms which export and belong to the 
high-tech manufacturing sector are the most regular participants in public calls. 
Furthermore, a firm’s previous participation enhances its current participation in a public 
call. This result shows that exporters and firms in high-tech sectors face higher 
technological pressures and try to find public funds. Our results are fairly robust under 
different specifications. 
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Regarding locational variables, we observe that firms located in the Barcelona metropolitan 
area have a lower probability of participating, while those in the second metropolitan 
region—in the manufacturing belt of Catalonia—have a higher probability. Finally, 
locational spillovers show a positive sign, but are only significant at an intra-industry level. 
Therefore, our results show that there is an unequal distribution of firms which 
policymakers should take into account. 
 
With respect to the determinants of being awarded a subsidy, projects presented 
cooperatively have a better likelihood of succeeding. In addition, our results do not suggest 
the existence of a “picking-the-winner” strategy, since firms that have received previous 
R&D subsidies do not show a higher probability. Our quality proxies of the firm and of the 
project seem to be significant and positive. Once we control for locational variables, firm 
age shows a positive sign on the likelihood of obtaining a subsidy. In general, firms 
operating in KIS services have lower probabilities of obtaining an R&D subsidy. With 
respect to the interaction between a targeted policy such as the R&D subsidy and the 
cluster policy, we observe that only firms belonging to the ICT sector show a significant 
(but negative) effect. 
 
The main policy implications are the following. The complex dynamics of innovation 
performance, knowledge and pecuniary spillovers and space concentration must be taken 
into account. Policymakers should design and implement R&D promotion policies 
considering that not all firms have the same propensity to participate in calls for public 
R&D subsidies. They must bear in mind what is their target group of firms and whether 
they have enough resources to participate. This requires combining initiatives in order to 
both reduce administrative costs to allow participation and also to enhance and facilitate 
the communication of experiences of local firms in the same sector where a firm is located. 
These policy implications may be particularly relevant for SMEs given that their lack of 
financial assets, and the absence of economies of scale and scope, place them at a 
disadvantage. In fact, the evaluation must be conceived as part of a process and must give 
useful information to policymakers. 
 
However, the selection of R&D projects is difficult due to expected externalities, a variety 
of objectives and multiple actors with different goals and preferences (Schilder, 2000; 
Corbett and Lennon, 2002; Bannò and Sgobbi, 2010). The interaction between all those 
factors determines the total budget allocated to R&D programs, its distribution across 
industries, the ranking criteria and screening rules applied in the selection of projects and 
firms, and the funding awarded to individual firms (Blanes and Busom, 2004, p. 1465). The 
selection of innovation projects and firms is crucial in order to tackle the regional 
innovation paradox of Oughton et al. (2002). This paradox refers to the apparent 
contradiction between the comparatively greater need to spend on innovation in lagging 
regions, and relatively lower capacity of these regions to absorb public funds. According to 
these authors, this is due to the fact that, although there are strong complementarities 
between firms, education and government spending on R&D, nevertheless innovation and 
industrial policies tend to work in opposite directions. 
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Table 1. 
Revision of the empirical literature 
Country Database Project? 
Type of 
program 
Methodology Determinants to participate Determinants to be awarded 
Blanes and Busom (2004) 
Spain Survey of Firm Strategies 
(ESEE- Encuesta sobre 
Estrategias 
Empresariales) 
NO – public 
support  
Multinomial 
logit 
Firm age, human capital (+), 
firm size (+), domestic (+), cash-
flow  
NO 
Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) 
Germany Mannheim Innovation 
Panel (MIP) and 
information from the 
German Patent 
Office. 
NO - 
Subsidies 
Probit Firm size, R&D department (+), 
patents (+), no patents (-), age(-), 
export (+), foreign (-), within 
group (-), concentration ratio 
(+). 
NO 
Huergo and Trenado (2008) 
Spain Centre for the 
Development for 
Industrial Technology 
and Iberic System of 
Balance Sheets (SABI) 
YES - Low-
Interest R&D 
Credits at the 
CDTI 
Two-step 
methodology 
Frim size (+), High-tech 
manufactures and kis (+), export 
(+), firm age (-), fixed assets (+), 
previous experience (+) 
SMEs (+),budget (+), High-tech manuf (-), 
technological innovation project (+), 
technical capability (+), collaboration with 
research centres (+), need for the new 
product/process (+), commercial 
perspectives (+), export possibilities (+), 
degree of substitution (-) 
Takalo et al. (2008) 
Finland Tekes and Asiakastieto 
Ltd 
YES - 
Subsidies 
Two-step 
methodology 
Not presented Risk (-), technical challenge (-), firm age, 
size (+), sales/employment, SMEs (+), 
parent company, previous applications, 
CEO, board size, exporter. 
Huergo and Trenado (2010) 
Spain Centre for the 
Development for 
Industrial Technology 
and Iberic System of 
Balance Sheets (SABI)  
YES - Low-
Interest R&D 
Credits at the 
CDTI 
Two-step 
methodology 
High-tech manufactures and kis 
(+), export (+), firm age (-), 
liquidity ratio, intangible fixed 
assets (-), previous experience 
(+) 
High-tech manuf (-), KIS, export, firm age, 
liquidity ratio, intangible fixed assets, 
previous experience, technological 
innovation project, R&D intensity (+), 
contribution of new knowledge (+), 
technical capability (+), collaboration with 
research centres (+), need for the new 
product/process (+), commercial 
perspectives (+), export possibilities (+), 
degree of substitution (-) 
Santamaría et al. (2010) 
Spain PROFIT programme YES - 
subsidies 
and credits 
without 
interest 
Probit NO  Pre-development (+), demonstration (+), 
viability (+), diffusion (+), international (+), 
expected R&D, expected investment (+), 
expected employment, universities, 
technology institutes, partners, budget (+), 
hours (+) 
Barajas et al. (2012) 
Spain Centre for the 
Development for 
Industrial Technology 
and Iberic System of 
Balance Sheets (SABI) 
YES - sixth 
EU FP  
Two-step 
methodology 
Previous application (+), 
previous projected (+), small 
firms (+), liquidity (-), profits, 
export (+), KIS (+), 
manufactures (+), intangible 
fixed assets (+), Leverage  
Previous experience (+),project budget, 
geographical distance (-), leader nationality, 
size of consortium (+)  
Busom et al. (2012) 
Spain Panel of Technological 
Innovation (PITEC- 
Panel de Innovación 
Tecnológica)  
NO – tax 
incentives and 
subsidies 
Bivariate 
Probit 
regression 
Financially constraint (+), 
dominant firm, demand risk, 
appropriability, productivity (-), 
human capital (+), group, export 
(-), internal R&D (-), firm size, 
new firm. 
NO 
Source: Current authors 
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Table 2. 
Summary statistics of firms, the innovation projects and subsidies (mean 
values). 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of firms
Non-participants 16433 13343 13462 13297 
Participants 205 172 149 161 
Non-awarded participants 140 84 75 89 
Awarded participants 65 88 74 72 
Expected cost 
Non-awarded participants 98,379.1 146,172.5 165,155.8 108,976.5 
Awarded participants 130,069.8 132,096.4 138,932.9 136,191.3 
Subsidy 
Amount of subsidy 16,946.1 24,383.8 33,534.95 29,565.6 
Final amount of subsidy 15,837.1 21,021.2 30,747.6 27,609.0 
Source: SABI database and ACC1Ó 
 
 
Table 3. 
Descriptive statistics for Catalan firms. Mean and standard deviations (in brackets) 
 
Non-participants
Non-awarded 
participants  
Awarded 
participants  
Sales (thousands €) 4,477.72
(4868.85) 
5,377.26
(7429,98) 
6,441.62 
(8120,01) 
Sales growth rate * -3.46%
(16143.00) 
0.07%
(172.02) 
-0.85% 
(39.95) 
Firm age (years) 15.06
(11.45) 
18.42
(13.08) 
19.56 
(13.10) 
Exporting activity (% firms) 24.51%
(0.43) 
52.97%
(0.49) 
61.53% 
(0.48) 
Cash-flow ratio 3.95%
(0.68) 
5.87%
(0.16) 
7.62% 
(0.10) 
Long- term debt ratio  20.91%
(21.45) 
89.02%
(9.91) 
42.08% 
(4.04) 
Location first area (% firms) 56.82%
(0.49) 
53.74%
(0.49) 
51.17% 
(0.50) 
Location second area (% firms) 16.88%
(0.16) 
20.41%
(0.40) 
24.08% 
(0.42) 
Priority industries (% firms) 17.79%
(0.36) 
26.35%
(0.44) 
26.75% 
(0.44) 
Previous public grant (number of 
times) 
0.02
(0.16) 
0.21
(0.47) 
0.24 
(0.51) 
Inter-spillovers 171,165.2
(172,077.1) 
193,693.8
(158,941.0) 
197,160.7 
(158,774.2) 
Intra-spillovers 3,516.6
(15,414.0) 
7,920.0
(25,148.5) 
6,217.5 
(18,388.9) 
* Median values 
Source: SABI database  
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Table 4. 
Descriptive statistics for Catalan firms. Mean and standard deviations (in 
brackets) 
 Non-awarded 
participants  
Participants awarded 
with a subsidy 
Project budget 124,385.4
(175,228.6) 
134,333.9
(309,239.6) 
Cooperation (% projects) 28.68
(45.29) 
17.06
(27.68) 
Number of awards previously 0.10
(0.34) 
0.13
(0.36) 
Quality of the project 5.40
(13.22) 
35.98
(11.06) 
Quality of the firm 0.31
(4.75) 
90.16
(17.23) 
Small firm (% firms) 56.07%
(49.69%) 
55.85%
(49.74%) 
Medium-sized firms (% firms) 17.31%
(37.88%) 
15.38%
(36.14%) 
Agricultural cluster (% firms) 9.82%
(29.80%) 
6.02%
(23.82%) 
Metallic cluster (% firms) 27.13%
(44.52%) 
29.76%
(45.80%) 
ICT cluster (% firms) 8.01%
(27.18%) 
8.70%
(28.22%) 
Source: SABI database and ACC1Ó
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 Table 5. 
Heckman probit estimation of the probability of obtaining an R&D subsidy for Catalan firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Probability of applying for a subsidy 
Firm size (t-1) 0.131 
(0.009)* 
0.122
(0.009)*
0.124
(0.009)*
0.124
(0.009)*
0.125 
(0.009)* 
Firm age (t-1) -0.0004 
(0.012) 
-0.002
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.012)
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Cash-flow ratio (t-1) 0.034 
(0.017)*** 
0.030
(0.018)***
0.028
(0.018)
0.028
(0.018)
0.029 
(0.018) 
Long-term debt ratio (t-1) -0.00004 
(0.00003) 
-0.00003
(0.00003)
-0.00004
(0.00003)
-0.00004
(0.00003)
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
Export  0.334 
(0.039)* 
0.312
(0.039)*
0.313
(0.039)*
0.313
(0.039)*
0.310 
(0.039)* 
Priority  -0.045 
(0.051) 
-0.013
(0.054)
-0.006
(0.054)
-0.006
(0.054)
0.001 
(0.055) 
Low-tech manufactures -0.308 
(0.057)* 
-0.279
(0.059)*
-0.299
(0.059)*
-0.299
(0.059)*
-0.243 
(0.061)* 
KIS  -0.449 
(0.064)* 
-0.396
(0.067)*
-0.427
(0.067)*
-0.427
(0.067)*
-0.372 
(0.070)* 
Previous application (t)  0.872
(0.048)*
0.865
(0.048)*
0.865
(0.048)*
0.860 
(0.048)* 
Metrop Area 1  -0.074
(0.038)*
-0.074
(0.038)***
-0.123 
(0.055)** 
Metrop Area 2  0.427
(0.046)*
0.130
(0.046)*
0.094 
(0.057)*** 
InterSpillovers (t)  0.004 
(0.006) 
IntraSpillovers (t)  0.014 
(0.005)* 
cons (t) -8.246 
(-) 
-9.739
(-)
-9.469
(0.098)
-9.495
(0.613)*
-9.613 
(-) 
Probability of obtaining a subsidy 
Project size (t) -0.004 
(0.030) 
0.117
(0.178)
0.127
(0.180)
0.111
(0.190)
0.114 
(0.192) 
Cooperation (t) -0.141 
(0.112) 
1.207
(0.416)*
1.230
(0.391)*
1.192
(0.350)*
1.190 
(0.335)* 
Previous concession (t)  -1.620
(0.596)*
-1.536
(0.599)*
-1.557
(0.589)*
-1.494 
(0.584)** 
Quality project (t)  0.026
(0.006)*
0.025
(0.006)*
0.025
(0.006)*
0.025 
(0.007)* 
Quality firm (t)  0.092
(0.024)*
0.094
(0.021)*
0.093
(0.019)*
0.093 
(0.017)* 
Small firm (t) 0.115 
(0.092) 
0.732
(0.396)***
0.721
(0.405)***
0.746
(0.390)***
0.726 
(0.392)*** 
Medium-sized firm (t) 0.253 
(0.140)*** 
0.861
(0.466)***
0.835
(0.488)***
0.821
(0.460)***
0.792 
(0.464)*** 
Firm age (t-1) -0.047 
(0.027)*** 
0.141
(0.145)
0.141
(0.142)
0.195
(0.098)**
0.196 
(0.096)** 
Firm growth (t) -0.0004 
(0.0002) 
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Low-tech manufactures 0.087 
(0.125) 
-0.343
(0.397)
-0.360
(0.414)
-0.649
(0.482)
-0.663 
(0.483) 
KIS  0.145 
(0.123) 
-1.288
(0.664)***
-1.347
(0.656)**
-1.667
(0.691)**
-1.685 
(0.682)** 
cluster_agro  -0.935
(0.701)
-0.937 
(0.684) 
cluster_metal  -0.034
(0.275)
-0.023 
(0.270) 
cluster_ict  -1.380
(0.630)**
-1.381 
(0.625)** 
cons (t) 1.605 
(0.455)* 
-4.800
(2.467)***
-5.236
(2.348)**
-4.938
(2.295)**
-4.815 
(2.030)**  -0.876 
(0.210)* 
-0.188
(0.505)
-0.052
(0.508)
0.010
(0.497)
0.097 
(0.465) 
Uncensored obs. 73709
Censored obs.  686
Wald 2 30.24 86.64 103.58 185.07 199.03 
Prob > 2  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time dummies included. 
*, ** and *** correspond at significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%
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